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Post-Soviet Civil Society Development in the Russian Federation: 
The Impact of the NGO Law 
 
Abstract 
The passing of the Russian NGO Law in mid-2006 set clear parameters for Russian NGO 
activity and civil society development. In this paper we assess the impact of the NGO Law on 
both NGOs and Russian civil society. Our findings illustrate that the NGO Law has led to a 
reduction in NGO activity and curtailment of civil society development. We conclude that 
Russian civil society appears to be dominated by groups funded and thus controlled by the 
VWDWH7KLVKDVLPSOLFDWLRQVIRU5XVVLD¶VRQ-going democratic development. 
  
2 
Introduction 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
developed erratically in a context of weak and incomplete regulation. This led to some NGOs 
to act as fronts for commercial or criminal organizations (Robertson, 2009) and the 
emergence of non-governmental individuals (NGIs) whose sole purpose was to chase 
predominantly overseas grant money (Henry, 2006). Eventually the Russian state realised 
that if NGOs had greater transparency and financial control it could encourage the 
professionalization of the sector and attract domestic philanthropists (Robertson, 2009). At 
the same time, prompted by the role played by internationally funded NGOs in the so-called 
µ&RORXU5HYROXWLRQV¶the Soviet successor states openly rejected overseas democracy 
assistance and thus sought to curtail its influence (Saari, 2009). Critical to this aim was the 
curbing of the activity and scope of such NGOs through restricting or outlawing the use of 
overseas funds (Maxwell, 2006). In tandem, the Kremlin perceived both foreign funded 
domestic and overseas groups as WDUQLVKLQJ5XVVLD¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDOUHSXWDWLRQSDUWLFXODUO\LQ
WKHDUHDVRIKXPDQULJKWVDQGGHPRFUDF\VHH0DFKOHGHUDQGWKDWRYHUVHDV1*2V¶
LQWHUYHQWLRQLQ5XVVLD¶VSURFHVVRISXEOLFHQYLURQPHQWDOHYDOXDWLRQZDVFXUWDLOLQJLWV
economic development (Digges, 2006). These perceptions and the desire for greater 
transparency of NGOs were all SRZHUIXOVWLPXOLLQVKDSLQJWKHSURYLVLRQVRIWKHODZµ2Q
Introducing Amendments into Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation¶NQRZQ
colloquially as the 2006 NGO Law (Maxwell, 2006). 
 
The Law, which had echoes of the 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious 
Associations, places an increased administrative burden on both domestic and foreign NGOs 
(Maxwell, 2006). It also increases the power of scrutiny of the state vis-à-vis NGO activity 
and membership (Kamhi, 2006) and places restrictions on the receipt of overseas donor funds 
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by domestic groups (Machleder, 2006). Each NGO, foreign or domestic, is now compelled to 
complete new registration documents detailing personal information about each member and 
founder, report all foreign donations and account for how that money is spent (Kamhi, 2006). 
The Law also offers the state wide-ranging scrutiny over all NGO documentation, including 
internal financial statements and those relating to group activity. It also permits the state to 
send representatives to NGO meetings, including those regarding private policy and 
campaigning activities (Maxwell, 2006). Further, the Law facilitates the review of the 
compliance of NGOs with their own stated goals (Maxwell, 2006), to ensure that 
organisational activities do not threaten the sovereignty of the Russian Federation.  
 
Since the NGO Law was passed in April 2006 it has been subject to a number of 
amendments. These include in 2009 exempting smaller NGOs or founders of NGOs from 
reporting their annual revenue if it was less than 3 million roubles (approx. $100,000). 
Mandatory audits of all NGOs would now take place once every three years rather than 
annually. Refusal to register organisations can also no longer be made on the grounds that a 
JURXSWKUHDWHQHGWKHµQDWLRQDOLQWHUHVWVRIWKH5XVVLDQ)HGHUDWLRQ¶DVLQWKHRULJLQDl 2006 
legislation. However, all other provisions ± including restrictions on overseas donor funding 
and powers to attend all NGO meetings, private or public ± remain intact.  
 
In July 2011, the Law was amended again, expanding the grounds on which the government 
could conduct unscheduled audits of NGOs. However this was subsequently repealed in 
November 2011. In July 2012 the Russian parliament passed additional legislation, which 
classifies NGOs with political activities and foreign funding as 'foreign agents', requiring 
them to file a report every quarter (Bennetts, 2012). Thus the 2006 NGO Law and its 
subsequent amendments appear to seek both to keep NGOs, particularly those with overseas 
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IXQGLQJRQDµYHU\WLJKWUHLQ¶5REHUVWRQDQGto contURORUµOLFHQVH¶5REHUWVRQ
2009: 541) Russian civil society. 
 
In this paper we examine the impact of the NGO Law on both NGOs and Russian civil 
society development to date. While some empirical assessment of the NGO Law based on 
studies of social organisations (Ljubownikow and Crotty, 2013), survey data (ICNL, 2007; 
Jakobson and Sanovich, 2010) and anecdotal evidence (Javeline and Lindemann-Komarova, 
2010) have been conducted, still missing from the literature is a detailed examination of the 
impact of the 2006 NGO Law on Russian NGOs with a more political profile. In this paper 
we address this gap by seeking to establish the influence of the Law on the day-to-day 
activities of environmental organisations and, ultimately, on RusVLD¶VFLYLOVRFLHW\
development.  
 
The paper is therefore structured as follows. To give some context to the study we first 
provide an overview of literature on the development of Russian civil society before the Law 
was introduced. We then describe the research study and methodologies from which the 
findings in this paper derive, before presenting findings on the impacts of the Law on day-to-
day activities. These include impacts on registration requirements and sources of funding, and 
on the development of civil society. With the 2006 NGO Law now occupying a central role 
within policy and legislation of Russian civil society, the findings in this paper therefore 
speak to the impacts of the Law on both Russian NGOs and civil society more broadly. Thus 
we now turn to present a brief overview of the literature regarding the development of civil 
society ex-ante the 2006 NGO Law. 
 
The Development of Russian Civil Society pre-2006 
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Civil society may be defined and conceptualised in a variety of ways, often dependant on the 
understanding of (and the interplay between) political systems, economic orientation, and 
religious traditions within a given society (Muukkonen, 2009). Despite the need for 
considering context in defining civil society, Muukkonen (2009) states that a common 
characteristic of understandings of civil society is the separation of this sector from the state. 
Hence, within the CEE context, Osborne and Kaposvari (1997) describe civil society as an 
intermediate public space that accommodates NGOs and other actors. Similarly Crotty 
(2009), in examining Russian NGOs, characterizes civil society as a space with intermediary 
organizations such as NGOs which promote democratic values, enable people to become 
active citizens and balance the power of the state. Thus in this paper, following Henry and 
Sundstrom (2006: 5), we GHILQHFLYLOVRFLHW\DV³DVSDFH of citizen-directed collective action 
located between the family and the state, and not directed solely toward private profit´ 
Organisations such as political parties, business firms, or organised crime groups are 
excluded from this definition (Henry & Sundstrom, 2006). This realm consists of a variety of 
institutional forms such as groups of people, formal and informal networks, associations, or 
organizations such as NGOs (Mercer, 2002).  
 
The term 'NGO' is more widely used to characterize formal civil society groups in 
democratizing contexts (Mercer, 2002), such as Russia (Spencer, 2011). NGOs are defined by 
WKH5XVVLDQ)HGHUDO/DZRQ3XEOLF$VVRFLDWLRQVDV³YROXQWDU\VHOI-governing, non-profit 
formations set-up by individuals who have united on the basis of the community interests to 
UHDOLVHFRPPRQJRDOV´Hence, NGOs are often politicized organizations, which challenge 
and attempt to influence decision-making within state institutions, such as NGOs promoting 
human rights or environmental protection.  
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The majority of research on Russian NGOs distils such organisations into three distinct 
groups (Crotty, 2006, 2009; Henry, 2006; Spencer, 2011). The first group are Marionette 
organizations, ³FUHDWHGE\WKHVWDWHRUJRYHUQPHQWRIILFLDOVDQGKDYHQROHDGHUVKLSRU
FRQVWLWXHQF\LQVRFLHW\´(Cook and Vinogradova, 2006: 34). Such organizations serve to 
OHJLWLPL]HFRPSOHPHQWDQGVXSSRUWWKHVWDWH¶VSROLF\DJHQGDDQGFUHDWHWKHLPDJHRIDQ
autonomous and functioning civil society (Cook and Vinogradova, 2006). The second group 
consists of grass-roots organizations (GROs) (Cook and Vinogradova, 2006). These small, 
locally based organizations without paid staff (Mercer, 2002) have found it difficult to attract 
funding either at home or abroad (Henderson, 2002). The third group is made up of 
traditional organizations (TNGOs) (Crotty, 2009) which are often larger, able to maintain 
paid staff (Mercer, 2002) and in the past were reliant on western funding (Jakobson and 
Sanovich, 2010). Accordingly, in this paper we characterise NGOs in the same way, which is 
particularly relevant for analytical purposes. 
 
Despite the existence of these NGOs, post-1991 development of Russian civil society has 
EHHQGHVFULEHGDVEHLQJLQDµKROGLQJSDWWHUQ¶, with organisations struggling to overcome 
both the legacy of the Soviet past and difficulties arising from a transitioning economic 
environment (Sundstrom and Henry, 2006). A range of factors have inhibited NGO 
development in post-Soviet Russia, including a lack of enthusiasm in public participation 
(Petukhov, 2004), nonparticipation in collective action (Rimskii, 2007), and rejection of 
formalized volunteering (Smolar, 1996). In addition the continuing dominance of Soviet 
cultural values in political institutions (Hedlund, 2006), as well as social organization 
(Spencer, 2011), meant that the majority of NGOs remained parochial and inward-looking 
(Crotty, 2006; Mendelson and Gerber, 2007; Spencer, 2011). This was exaggerated by the 
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absence of domestic funding sources (HSE, 2011), leaving domestic NGOs reliant on 
overseas funding for their activities. 
 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union but prior to the passing of the NGO Law many 
scholars (Klose, 2000; Henry, 2001; Mendleson, 2001; Henderson, 2002; Richter, 2000, 
2002; Weinthal, 2002; Crotty, 2003, Murphy, 2003, Sundstrom, 2005) noted that rather than 
bolstering its development, overseas funding has created a class of NGO distanced from 
Russian society and thus ³widened the gap between activists and the rest of society´ 
(Henderson, 2002, p. 75). Access to overseas grants was administered by competitive tender, 
pitching groups against one another for funds, rather than drawing them together into larger, 
more effective constituencies (Crotty, 2006). In addition, failure to sufficiently contextualise 
this assistance (Crotty, 2003) meant that Russian groups adopted the western agendas 
imposed by overseas funding bodies (Henry, 2001; Henderson, 2002; HSE, 2011; Richter, 
2000, 2002; Crotty, 2003, Murphy, 2003, Sundstrom, 2005).  
 
A minority of commentators illustrated the benefits of overseas funding, including: 
democracy building and the development of civil society (Weinthal, 2002); the fostering of 
more democratic NGOs (Mendleson, 2001); and the assisting of NGOs in achieving their 
goals through grant assisted projects and actions (Klose, 2000). However the majority (see 
Henry, 2001; Henderson, 2002; Richter, 2000, 2002; Crotty, 2003, Murphy, 2003, 
Sundstrom, 2005) indicated that a lack of contextualisation and inappropriate administration 
facilitated little more than maintaining their (NGOs) continued existence (Henry, 2001). This, 
combined with the competition injected into the Russian NGO sector by the presence of 
foreign funding, meant that groups were active but isolated. They may have had the ability to 
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act as a counter-weight to the state (Taylor, 2006), but they did not facilitate bridging activity 
between the individual and the state (Richter, 2002). 
 
$VQRWHGIROORZLQJWKHµ&RORXU5HYROXWLRQV¶LQ8NUDLQH*HRUJLDDQG.\UJ\]VWDQLQ
and 2005, the Russian state began to view overseas democracy assistances as a challenge to 
its sovereignty. The 2006 NGO Law therefore was not only an attempt to impose order in 
what was a dispersed and underdeveloped sector but also to curb foreign support for NGOs. 
However, as the NGO Law was justified under the veil of encouraging the development of 
domestic funding for NGOs, Russian state authorities established the Public Chamber of the 
Russian Federation (Richter, 2009) to provide a substitute for this funding$VWKH³PLQLVWU\
RIFLYLOVRFLHW\´(Richter, 2009: 7), the Public Chamber was responsible for the 
administration of federal funding to NGOs via government grants. Despite totalling one 
billion roubles (ca 32 million US dollars) in 2010 (Public Chamber of the Russian Federation, 
2010) and increased to two billion roubles (64 million US dollars) (Public Chamber of the 
Russian Federation, 2012), accessing these funds continues to be on the basis of competitive 
grants. Consequently, only 604 out of Russia¶VHVWLPDWHG1*2VUHFHLYLQJthis 
funding to date (Public Chamber of the Russian Federation, 2010). Furthermore, the 
allocation of these funds is argued to lack transparency (Schaaf et. al., 2009) and thus there 
remains a strong perception that the majority of funds reside in Moscow. 
 
For Russian commentators this has been the beginning of a process of import-substitution 
(Jakobson and Sanovich, 2010; HSE, 2011) leading to the emergence of a third sector that 
reflects the Russian context (Ljubownikow et al., 2013), with the state now the funder of 
Russia¶VWKLUGVHFWRU and overseas donors in retreat. For example between 2001-2011 USAID 
spent more than three billion US dollars on democracy assistance and other programmes in 
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the Russian Federation, and was planning to spend another 50 million in 2012 before it was 
forced to withdraw (BBC, 2012). While the Russian press reported this withdrawal as a shift 
in funding priorities by USAID (Tropkina, 2012), the US state department stated that this 
decision waVLQVWHDGPRWLYDWHGE\WKH5XVVLDQJRYHUQPHQW¶VH[SOLFLWUHMHFWLRQRIIRUHLJQ
assistance (Nuland, 2012). This example indicates the significant reduction of overseas 
funding available to Russian NGOs with only a fraction of it being substituted by the state 
since the passing of the 2006 NGO Law and its subsequent amendments.  
 
Given the above, in this paper we seek to establish what has been the reaction of Russian 
NGOs to the NGO Law. With the impact on funding and the registration requirements likely 
to add an additional burden to NGOs, how and in what ways has the NGO Law impacted 
their day-to-day activities? To what extent ± if at all, given its historical under-development ± 
has the NGO law contributed to the stalling of Russian civil society development? We 
explore these propositions by operationalizing interview data collected from environmental 
NGOs (eNGOs) in three regions of the Russian Federation. Before we present our findings, 
we outline the methodology of the research study below. 
 
Methodology 
In this paper we focus on eNGOs because the environmental movement occupies a unique 
position in Soviet history; it was the only dissident movement to be openly tolerated by the 
regime (Weiner, 2002). Given this, ordinary Russians viewed it as a relatively safe issue 
about which to protest and so, for a brief time during the Glasnost era, the environmental 
movement became popular. This popularity stemmed not from widespread recognition of the 
HQYLURQPHQWDOPRYHPHQW¶VDLPVEXWZDVLQstead a veil under which general dissent would be 
expressed (Yanitsky, 1999). Accordingly, it facilitated organized and effective mass protests 
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and actively spanned the gap between the individual and the state. Thus with the longest 
heritage and the only movement to have a history of amassing general support from the wider 
population and contributing to civil society development, we focus explicitly on the impact of 
the Law on eNGOs. 
 
The data presented in this paper, collected as part of a wider UK Economic and Social 
Research Council-funded research project, arises from three industrial Krai and Oblasti in the 
Russian Federation. 1 The Oblasti of Samara and Volgograd and Stavropol Krai were chose 
for our study because the urban centres of Moscow and St. Petersburg do not always 
represent the experience of organizations in provincial Russia (Javeline and Lindemann-
Komarova, 2010). In addition, as Moscow and St. Petersburg have been subjected to greater 
forces of economic and social transformation (Mansvelt, 2005) than other areas of Russia, it 
is unlikely that findings from these two cities would be representative of civil society 
development across the Russian Federation.  
 
The three regions chosen for this study have a GRP (gross regional product) per capita within 
the Russian average (IMF Russia, 2008) and are 80% or greater ethnic Russian (Federal State 
Statistics Service, 2010). Each also has a significant industrial base including the immense 
/DGD3ODQW$YWR9$=LQ7RO¶\DWWL 6DPDUD2EODVW¶DQGWKHVSHFLDOLVWLQGXVWULDOFLWLHV of 
Budennovsk (oil refining) and Nevinnomyssk (chemical production) in Stavropol Krai. 
9ROJRJUDGLVDOVRKRPHWR5XVVLD¶V largest tractor factory and hydro-electric dam. Thus these 
three regions are not only representative of provincial Russian cities but also provide the 
study with a sufficiently similar economic and social context to examine contrasts and 
similarities between the regions, minimizing potential regional factors to act as explanatory 
influences (Miles and Huberman, 1999).  
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Miles and Huberman (1999) assert that an inductive research design is undertaken where the 
WHUULWRU\XQGHUHQTXLU\LVµH[FHVVLYHO\FRPSOH[¶DQGWKHLQWHQWLVH[SORUDWRU\*LYHQWKH
G\QDPLFQDWXUHRI5XVVLD¶VHFRQRPLFDQGVRFLDOGHYHORSPHQW, and the lack of literature on 
the NGO Law and its impact, an inductive research design was deemed appropriate. Such an 
DSSURDFKDOVRHQDEOHVXVWRFDSWXUHWKHUHVSRQGHQW¶VRZQLQWHUSUHWDWLRQV(Eisenhardt, 1989), 
assisting us in evaluating how respondents portray the NGO Law and its impact on both their 
everyday lives and on civil society as a whole.  
 
The literature on civil society development in Russia (Sundstrom and Henry, 2006), as well 
as aspects of the legislative changes and assessment thereof in the literature (Maxwell, 2006), 
informed a semi-structured interview protocol, which was translated into Russian for data 
collection. Interviews lasted between thirty to ninety minutes and were conducted in Russian 
with the aid of an interpreter. To reduce self-reporting bias, interview data was triangulated 
with data, observational and artefacts, collected by attending eNGO events (Miles and 
Huberman, 1999). The focus of the data collection process was to establish the impact of the 
Law specifically on the modus operandi of NGOs and their contribution to civil society 
development. Data collection included reflective periods to adjust and amend the interview 
protocol in order to capture and probe any arising issues.  
 
NGOs, which the Russian NGO Law defines as µpublic organizations¶, were recruited using 
gatekeepers at universities in each of the three regions and snowballing techniques. A total of 
26 NGOs participated in the interviews.2 All interviews were transcribed and translated into 
English in situ, calling on the skills of native speakers wherever discrepancies arose. The 
interview material was then coded inductively for themes to answer the question of how the 
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NGO Law has impacted eNGOs. As the interview transcripts were read and reread, new 
codes emerged and existing codes were adjusted (Charmaz and Mitchell, 2007). This process 
also established relationships between different aspects of the data (Miles and Huberman, 
1999).  
 
To ensure that the organizations and the participants remain anonymous, and the data 
confidential, in the discussion that follows the data is referred to according to the adopted 
coding system. As such each NGO is referred to as for example 1.8, with 1 denoting region 
(1=Samara; 2=Stavropol; 3=Volgograd) and 8 denoting the specific NGO (see Appendix 1 
for an overview of interviewees). The discussion that follows explores these issues using 
QDUUDWLYHVIURPWKHVHLQWHUYLHZVDQG³LOOXPLQDWLQJ exDPSOHV´(de Vaus, 2001: 240) to 
exemplify key points. 
 
The NGO Law: Impact on Day-to-Day Activities 
More than any other issue, the impact of the NGO Law on the funding of day-to-day 
activities was asserted by the TNGOs and GROs groups in this study. The removal of foreign 
funding and reliance almost exclusively on government-based grants had resulted in, if not 
total curtailment, a reduction in activity. Other aspects of the Law, particularly the 
registration requirements, also distracted many TNGOs from their day-to-day activities 
resulting in a reduction in the number of active eNGOs. In contrast, Marionette organisations 
had fewer problems aligning their activities with government interests and thus did not 
experience the same funding or registration issues. We explore these findings in more detail 
below. 
Registration Requirements 
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As stated earlier, the NGO Law requires each NGO, foreign or domestic, to complete 
registration documents detailing personal information about each member and founder, as 
well as report all foreign donations and account for how that money is spent (Kamhi, 2006; 
Maxwell, 2006). The Law also provides the state with access to all NGO documentation 
including internal financial statements and those relating to group activity. Although many 
groups in this study alluded to these requirements, perceptions of the difficulties associated 
with compliance were mixed.  
 
Marionettes and the larger TNGOs with either state and/or enterprise funding stated that it 
µZDVQRWDSUREOHPLI\RXNQRZZKDW\RXDUHGRLQJ¶,QWHUYLHZ; that these requirements 
ZHUH D PDWWHU RI µFRPSHWHQFH¶ ,QWHUYLHZ  DQG were µQRW GLIILFXOW¶ ,QWHUYLHZHHV 
1.10). µ/DZ-abidLQJ¶,QWHUYLHZH1*2V, it was argued, would have no problems in the 
µYDULRXVSUHSDUDWLRQVDQGGRFXPHQWDWLRQ¶,QWHUYLHZUHTXLUHGIRUUHJLVWUDWLRQ Moreover, 
in line with some of the prescribed motivations for the NGO Law ± that it would encourage a 
professionalized sector capable of convincing domestic philanthropists to make donations 
(Robertson, 2009) ± WKHVHJURXSVDOVRIHOWWKDWWKH1*2/DZKDGµIRUFHGWKHSURIHVVLRQDOLVP
of non-SURIHVVLRQDORUJDQLVDWLRQV¶ ,QWHUYLHZ.14), and as a result had reduced the overall 
number. As Interviewee 3.4 explains, 
:LWKWKHFKDQJHVLQWKHUXOHVDERXWUHJLVWUDWLRQDORWRIµDPDWHXU¶1*2VKDYHVLPSO\
vanished and failed to register as they deemed the registration process to be too 
FXPEHUVRPH$VZHVD\µWKHKROLGD\VKDYHILQLVKHG¶,QWHUYLHZ 
 
Conversely other groups, predominantly GROs and TNGOs without funding or who had 
previously relied on overseas funding, viewed the registration requirements as µextremely 
FRPSOLFDWHG¶ ,nterview 3.2). An µLQFUHDVHG DPRXQW RI SDSHUZRUN¶ ,QWHUYLHZ 
14 
GLVWUDFWHGWKHPIURPWKHLURWKHUDFWLYLWLHV$VDUHVXOWµORWVRIVPDOORUJDQLVDWLRQVVLPSO\GLG
QRW UHJLVWHU« WKH\ GLGQ¶W KDYH WKH WLPH« RU WKH ILQDQFLDO UHVRXUFHV¶ (Interview 3.1), 
including one organisation in this study;  
2XURUJDQLVDWLRQGRHVQRWKDYHWKHULJKWRID OHJDOSHUVRQ>QRWUHJLVWHUHG@«2QHRI
the main reasons we did this was because of the very complicated system of 
LQVSHFWLRQVDQGUHSRUWV«7KHUHDUHVRPDQ\UHVWULFWLRQVPDNing the activity of public 
RUJDQLVDWLRQVLPSRVVLEOH«YHU\IHZVXUYLYH,QWHUYLHZ 
Groups themselves ± Marionette, TNGO and GRO ± acknowledged that the requirements 
have reduced the number of active organisations. One group estimated that while there were 
µRUJDQLVDWLRQV«RQO\VRPHKXQGUHGVRIWKHPUHQGHUHGWKHUHSRUWV>UHJLVWHUHG@DERXW
¶ ,QWHUYLHZ  Thus WKH RIILFLDO 1*2 QXPEHUV LQ 6DPDUD 2EODVW¶ GURSSHG
considerably as a result of the registration requirements. Reference to smaller groups failing 
WRUHJLVWHUZDVDOVRDFNQRZOHGJHGLQERWK6WDYURSRO.UDLDQG9ROJRJUDG2EODVW¶ZLWKJURXSV
VWDWLQJ WKDW µVPDOO FOXEV ZKLFK IRXQG LW WRR GLIILFXOW WR UHJLVWHU« KDYH VLPSO\ JRQH
³XQGHUJURXQG´DQGGRQ¶WUHJLVWHUWKHPVHOYHVEXWWKH\H[LVW¶,QWHUYiew 3.1). 
 
Evidence here points to two outcomes. First, the registration requirements have resulted in 
WKH UHGXFWLRQ RI µRIILFLDO¶ H1*2V *URXSV PD\ UHPDLQ XQ-registered, but are not formally 
listed by the state and as such become ineligible for state funding (as discussed below). 
Secondly, the registration requirements are sufficiently complex that they favour larger, well-
resourced organisations, notably the Marionettes and TNGOs with state and/or enterprise 
funding that have the time and the expertise in-house to complete this paperwork. 
Consequently, those groups aligned with the states¶ objectives in terms of remit and/or 
financing have been able to navigate the demands of the NGO Law far more successfully 
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than those which were not. These findings are reinforced when we examine the impact of the 
NGO Law on the funding of eNGOs in the following section. 
 
Sources of Funding  
In addition to increased registration requirements, the NGO Law also placed restrictions on 
the receipt of overseas donor funds by domestic groups (Machleder, 2006), with each NGO 
now compelled to report all foreign donations and account for how that money is spent 
(Kamhi, 2006). This provision hit particularly hard those groups that had previously been in 
receipt or relied on foreign funds for their activity. These groups, predominantly TNGOs, 
VWDWHGWKDWQRZLWZDVYHU\µGLIILFXOW¶,QWHUYLHZVbecause µWKHUHDUHQRPRUH
foreign grants, EHIRUH WKHUH XVHG WR EH¶ ,QWHUYLHZ 1.7). In the new environment western 
IXQGLQJ ZDV YHU\ PXFK µFRQWUROOHG¶ ,QWHUYLHZ  and µIURZQHG XSRQ¶ ,QWHUYLHZ 
ZLWKDQµXQVSRNHQDJUHHPHQWWKDWJRRGRUJDQLVDWLRQVVKRXOGQRWDFFHSWIXQGLQJIURPVSHFLILF
RUJDQLVDWLRQV VXFK DV86$,'¶ ,QWHUYLHw 1.13). Some went further, stating that µLW LV FOHDU
WKDW WKHVWDWHGRHVQ¶WZDQW1*2VWREHIXQGHGE\H[WHUQDOGRQRUV¶,QWHUYLHZ ,QWKHLU
view WKH µSXUSRVH¶ ,QWHUYLHZ  RI WKH 1*2 Law was to ensure that groups did not 
receive foreign funding, restricting income to that which the state could control.   
 
TNGOs in this study were vocal in expressing perceived inadequacies of this system, stating 
that grants from the Public CKDPEHU RQO\ ZHQW WR µ³their´ >WKH VWDWH¶V@ NGOs, groups of 
people who have surrendered their independence and simply carry out the orders of their 
SROLWLFDOPDVWHUV¶,QWHUYLHZ*UDQWVwere also considered to have WRRPDQ\µFRQGLWLRQV¶
,QWHUYLHZµSDUDPHWHUV¶,QWHUYLHZRUDVWDWHVSHFLILHGµIUDPHZRUN¶,QWHUYLHZ
3.2) attached; that the object of government grants was to µtrickle down of the political 
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PHVVDJHIURPDERYH¶,QWHUYLHZ,QWHUYLHZHHFDSWXUHVPDQ\RIWKH71*2DQG*52
complaints, 
We will apply for a grant and in the programme of action outline our intentions. If 
WKHVHLQWHQWLRQVLQWHUIHUHRUGLVUXSWWKHµVWDWXVTXR¶WKHQZHZLOOVLPSO\QRWEHJLYHQ
any money. The organisers say how we must spend this money and what activities are 
µH[SHFWHG¶IURPXV7KHUHLVD clearly outlined framework here for NGOs to follow. If 
you want to win grants and be active then you can win these grants, but your actions 
will be totally controlled by the powers that be. (Interview 3.1) 
Government grants were also regarded as WRR µFRPSHWLWLYH¶ ,QWHUYLHZ , creating 
animosity between NGO groups. The process was also viewed as too µFRPSOLFDWHG¶
,QWHUYLHZDQG WKHDPRXQWV WRRµVPDOO¶,QWHUYLHZWRµFRYHUWKH
banking costs we must pay to remain a registered 1*2¶,QWHUYLHZ2WKHUVUHSRUWHGWKDW
grant money, having been won, was not always received; µZH WKHQ ZDLWHG DQG ZDLWHG WR
receive the money and finally we were told that the money had been given to another 
RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶ ,QWHUYLHZ  2QH RUJDQLVDWLRQ VWDWHG WKDW WKH\ KDG EHHQ µNLFNHG RXW¶
(Interview 1.10) after winning a grant for supplying incorrect information. Many also 
DVVHUWHG WKDW DQ\ JUDQW LQFRPH WKDW WKH\ GLG ZLQ ZDV µWD[HG¶ ,QWHUYLHZ   
PHDQLQJWKDWRIWHQDJUDQWµWDNHVDZD\PRUHWKDQLWJLYHV¶,QWHUYLHZ 
 
References to increased workload or strains on payment and salary as a result of decreased 
funding were also commonplace in the interviews, as this except illustrates, 
Grants take away many forces, time and even money. Even this summer I have 
written the grant, have spent one and a half month and hundred thousand roubles, but 
some months have passed and I have QRWUHFHLYHGWKHDQVZHU«7KHEDVLFREVWDFOH± 
DEVHQFHRIILQDQFLQJ:HGRQ¶WHYHQKDYHRXURZQRIILFH. (Interview 1.15) 
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In contrast to the past, where many TNGOs had been reliant on overseas grants (Crotty, 2009; 
Henry, 2010; Carmin and Fagan, 2010), these factors had led many TNGOs and GROs in this 
VWXG\ WR µVLPSO\QRWERWKHU¶ ,QWHUYLHZDSSO\LQJ IRU grant funding (Interview 1.1; 1.2; 
1.8; 1.15; 3.2; 3.6). As organisations were unlikely to receive the funding, or would have the 
funding withdrawn or taxed, PDQ\YLHZHGLWDVDµSRLQWOHVVH[HUFLVH¶,QWHUYLHZ 
 
Yet groups also saw the rejection of state-sponsored grant funding as a way to remain 
µLQGHSHQGHQW¶,QWHUYLHZ). As a result, many groups now 
relied on personal income, e.g. µZHXVH WKH IODWVRIRXUDFWLYLVWV IRUPHHWLQJV DQGRXURZQ
rHVRXUFHVWRRUJDQLVHGHPRQVWUDWLRQVDQGPHHWLQJV¶,QWHUYLHZDOVRPRQH\
WKH\ FRXOG UDLVH IURP DFWLYLWLHV IRU H[DPSOH µPRQH\ ZH HDUQ RXUVHOYHV E\ H[FXUVLRQV«
DURXQG WKH UHVHUYHG DUHD¶ ,QWHUYLHZ  GRQDWLRQV IURP PHPEHUV ,QWHUYLHZ 1.16), or 
µYROXQWDU\ZRUN¶,QWHUYLHZ 
 
In addition, GRO and TNGO participants also reflected on and confirmed wide-spread 
perceptions about the geographical distribution of state-sponsored grant funding (Schaaf, et. 
al., 2009), summing it up respectively; 
We are sure that all these awards are distributed in Moscow. Sly people deal with it 
there. And we cannot beat them. (Interview 1.8) 
...the purpose of this law was that the organizations did not receive foreign 
investments. Only The all-Union and Moscow organizations received state 
investment. (Interview 1.15) 
The uneven geographical distribution of these federal funds therefore further discouraged 
eNGOs in this study from applying for financial support. 
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Like the registration requirements discussed above, the absence of funding had also impacted 
the ability of groups to engage in or influence policy, 
Nowadays public organisations cannot significantly influence the decision-making 
SURFHVV«SXEOLFRUJDQLVDWLRQVGRQRWKDYHVXIILFLHQWUHVRXUFHVor qualified specialists 
(Interview 1.15) 
And had reduced the overall number of active groups, 
Until now there were over 3000 public organisations in Samara. Not all of them were 
registered. Now their number dropped because it is impossible to maintain these 
organisations financially (Interview 1.8). 
Conversely, Marionette organisations reported fewer difficulties. Whilst acknowledging that 
WKHUHPRYDORIIRUHLJQIXQGLQJKDGEHHQDµKXJHSUREOHP¶,QWHUYLHZIRUWKRVHZKRKDG
relied on it, they did not report difficulties with securing funding, as alluded to by the TNGOs 
and GROs in this study. Instead groups more commonly described government support as 
µUDWKHU LPSUHVVLYH DQG VROLG¶ ,QWHUYLHZRU µEHQHILFLDO DQG VXSSRUWLYH¶ ,QWHUYLHZ
Others discuss how they have won multiple grants for multiple projects (Interview 1.5; 1.6; 
1.11), E\ µSDUWLFLSDWLQJ LQ FRPSHWLWLRQVZLWKQRSUREOHPV¶ ,QWHUYLHZ$OWKRXJKD IHZ
did complain that the procedures for participating in these competitions could bHµSURWUDFWHG¶
,QWHUYLHZ  DQG µEXUHDXFUDWLF¶  JHQHUDOO\0DULRQHWWHVZHUHKDSS\ WRGLVFXVV
the extent to which the state supported their activities. For instance,  
Our undertakings are often supported by the local government, and that is very 
pleasant for us. A lot of our projects have acquired the regional status because of the 
organizational and financial support of the government and the Ministry of Natural 
Resources in particular. (Interview 1.6) 
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In addition, unlike the TNGOs and GROs, no Marionette reported other problems, such as 
failure to receive grant funding or having funding removed or taxed. No Marionette 
complained that the state attached too many conditions to the funding received.  
 
:LWKLQWKHOLWHUDWXUHRQ5XVVLD¶VFLYLOVRFiety development there has been a debate about the 
benefits of foreign funding. Crotty (2006, 2009) has posited that while it may have assisted 
individual NGOs in their organizational development, foreign funding also broke the link 
between domestic NGOs and the Russian public, contributing to the continuing under-
development of Russian civil society (Henry, 2001; Henderson, 2002; Richter, 2000, 2002; 
Crotty, 2003; Murphy, 2003; Sundstrom, 2005). This notwithstanding, overseas funding was 
independent of state control and it is clear from these discourses that the absence, outlawing 
or inability to apply for overseas funding is now keenly felt.  
 
Moreover, this discourse also illustrates that the Russian government have been successful in 
restricting the influence of overseas organisations within Russian civic life, a key motivator 
in passing the NGO Law in the first place (Maxwell, 2006). By removing this source of 
funding, domestic NGOs are now restricted to applying for competitive grants via the Public 
Chamber, seeking enterprise sponsorship, or using their membership to raise funds. This 
SURFHVV DSSHDUV WR UHSOLFDWH WKH µFRPSHWLWLYH¶ HOHPHQW RI RYHUVHDV JUDQWV SLWFKLQJ JURXSV
against one another rather than facilitating co-operation between them (Crotty, 2006; 2009). 
TNGOs and GROs in this study also describe the restrictions this has placed on their activity, 
whilst the Marionettes appeared less troubled by them. It is no surprise that Marionette 
organisations, those closely aligned to the state, have found it easier to navigate the funding 
implications of the NGO Law. Having not previously relied on overseas funding, such groups 
had less to lose as a result of its provisions.  
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The NGO Law: Impact of Civil Society Development 
Views were once again split between a group made up of TNGOs and GROs, whose 
dominant view was that the Law had been harmful, and Marionettes who thought that the 
Law and its provisions were the ULJKWZD\WRµFRQWURO¶,QWHUYLHZ5XVVLDQFLYLOVRFLHW\ 
development. We explore these differences below. 
 
The views of TNGOs and GROs in this study towards the general purpose of the NGO Law 
are encapsulated in the following commentary, 
I think that the adoption of this Law shows us [that] our State has a very poor 
understanding of non-FRPPHUFLDORUJDQLVDWLRQV³,I,GRQRWXQGHUVWDQGZKDWLWLV,¶G
EHWWHUPDNHVRPHUHVWULFWLRQVWRSUHYHQWLWIURPVSUHDGLQJ´. (Interview 1.14) 
Despite some of the larger TNGOs stating that they had had no problem with the registration 
requirements, all of the TNGOs and GROs felt that the LDZZRXOGKDUP5XVVLD¶VFLYLO
society development, viewing it as part of a wider attempt E\WKH6WDWHWRFRQWUROµDOODVSHFWV
of politLFDOVRFLHWDODQGFXOWXUDOOLIH¶,QWHUYLHZ. The Law had taken away the µR[\JHQ¶
(Interview 3.1; 3.2) for a vibrant civil society to survive, making it very difficult for 
independent eNGOs to operate.  
 
As such respondents viewed the Law as an attempt by the state to both undermine democracy 
and reconstruct civil society in a way that it could control, as this excerpt describes, 
Civil society is systematically being destroyed from above. Administrative and 
financial pressures are being systematically used to destroy civil society in Russia. In 
its place, they are trying to build a civil society in a conformist and ordered fashion 
from above with no respect for individual autonomy or the principles of democratic 
rule. (Interview 3.2) 
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Others defined WKLV DV D µEDFNVOLGLQJ RI GHPRFUDF\¶ ,QWHUYLHZ  WKDW µFLYLO VRFLHW\ LQ
5XVVLDWRGD\LVEHLQJIRUPDOLVHG¶,QWHUYLHZ LQWRDµ³variant´ of civil society that they 
>WKHVWDWH@DJUHHZLWK¶,QWHUYLHZ7KHUHVXOWZDVWKDW LQGHSHQGHQWRUJDQLVDWLRQVZRXOG
µEHHDVLO\VXSSUHVVHGILQDQFLDOO\RUSROLWLFDOO\¶,QWHUYLHZAs a consequence the focus 
was now on Marionette organisations, µset up by the state to create the image of a functioning 
FLYLO VRFLHW\¶ ,QWHUYLHZ , whilst TNGOs and GROs struggled under the threat of 
µOLTXLGDWLRQ¶,QWHUYLHZ$VD UHVXOW UHVSRQGHQWVDJDLQ LQGLFDWHG WKDW WKLVVLWXDWLRQKDG
led to the reduction in the overall number of eNGOs; µXQGHUWKHVHFRQGLWLRQVORWVRI1*2V
KDYHVLPSO\VWRSSHGIXQFWLRQLQJ¶,QWHUYLHZ 
 
The views of TNGOs and GROs above were strongly countered by those of the Marionette 
organisations in this study. Interestingly, in expressing their support for the NGO Law, 
Marionettes also suggested some of the reasons cited as motivators for WKH/DZ¶VLQFHSWLRQ
LQFOXGLQJ WKH WKUHDW RI µRUDQJH UHYROXWLRQV¶ ,QWHUYLHZ  DQG WKH QHHG for the State to 
µSURWHFWV LWVHOI¶ ,QWHUYLHZ  $V D UHVXOW, Marionettes echoed Interviewee 1.4 in stating 
that µWKH6WDWHKDVWKHULJKWWRNQRZZKDWQRQ-FRPPHUFLDORUJDQLVDWLRQVGR¶,QWHUYLHZ
DQGVRµ)HGHUDOFRQWURORIWKHV\VWHPLVUHDOO\QHFessar\¶,QWHUYLHZ$VDUHVXOW it was 
suggested that µWKH VWDWH ZDV µWU\LQJ WR ³PDQDJH´ FLYLO VRFLHW\ LQ 5XVVLD WRGD\¶ ,QWHUYLHZ
 2WKHUV IHOW WKDW µLW LV UHDOO\ LPSRUWDQW WKDW WKH JRYHUQPHQW VKRXOG VXSSRUW WKH
development of non-governmental organisations because without them there would be no 
FLYLOVRFLHW\¶,QWHUYLHZ.  
 
In addition, some interviewees countered suggestions from the TNGOs and GROs that the 
Law had resulted in significant changes and presented a risk to eNGOs more generally, as 
this commentary explains, 
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5HJDUGLQJ WKH1*2/DZ ,FDQVD\ WKDW WKLVKDVQ¶WFKDQJHG WKH ODQGVFDSH IRU
NGO activities in Russia very much. For example, contrary to some opinions, all 
NGOs in Russia now are not constantly being pressurised and harassed by the police 
or the security services. In reality, such a situation is not happening. (Interview 3.4) 
These contradictions LQRSLQLRQZLWK UHJDUGV WKH LPSDFWRI WKH1*2/DZRQ5XVVLD¶VFLYLO
society development are not surprising, especially given the perceptions of the TNGOs and 
GROs that the Marionettes have been the ones to have benefitted from these regulatory 
changes. Moreover, these differences in the felt impacts of the NGO Law also indicate a shift 
in emphasis towards Marionette organLVDWLRQV DV WKH GRPLQDQW JURXS ZLWKLQ 5XVVLD¶V WKLUG
sector. We explore the implications of this IRU 5XVVLD¶V FLYLO VRFLHW\ GHYHORSPHQW and the 
other findings in this study below. 
 
Conclusions 
Before we draw conclusions it is necessary to acknowledge the limitations of this paper. 
Firstly, while we have sought to obtain data from environmental NGOs based in provincial 
industrial regions of Russia, care must be taken in extrapolating these findings either to more 
rural regions, autonomous republics, or Moscow or St Petersburg where it is more likely that 
international influences will shape the activity of NGOs. Likewise, the recent protests 
UHJDUGLQJ3XWLQ¶VUH-election to the Presidency in March 2012 were confined to the capitals 
(ancient and modern) and did not spread to these provinces, indicating that such activity was 
not representative of the Russian population, or civil society as a whole. Secondly, the 
findings in this paper were drawn from 26 eNGOs; had different NGOs or NGOs from a 
different sector been chosen, we may have garnered a different set of narratives. Yet the 
narratives that were collated have provided a depth to NGO perceptions, response and impact 
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of the NGO Law not yet explored in-depth within the literature. From this some key 
observations and conclusions can be drawn. 
 
The key observations that can be drawn from the evidence in this paper are essentially 
threefold. Firstly, despite the overall reduction in the availability of overseas democracy 
assistance in the wake of global financial crisis (IDS, 2008), the 2006 NGO Law represents 
an outright rejection of overseas funding (Saari, 2009) by the Russian government. This 
rejection was not based on supply, but on perceived threats to WKH VWDWH¶V VRYHUHLJQW\ 
IROORZLQJ WKH µ&RORXU 5HYROXWLRQV¶ RI WKH PLG-2000s. One of the 2006 NGO /DZ¶V
objectives was to encourage the development of alternative domestic funding sources, 
particularly philanthropic activities by Russia¶s elite and businesses. Even though donations 
in Russia have increased, mainly driven by corporate philanthropy (Khodorova, 2006), 
Livshin and Weitz (2006) highlight that most domestic donation, an estimated 90%, go to 
state-run bodies such as orphanages and not to NGOs. Further, Sundstrom (2011) highlights 
that if such donations do go to NGOs they mainly fund single events rather than providing 
funding for the sustainable existence of such organisations.  
 
Thus the removal of overseas funding essentially leaves the NGO sector with the state as the 
primary financier. This has two implications. Marionette organisations are likely to be more 
closely aligned to the states objectives, and thus find it easier to secure this funding ± a 
finding illustrated above. In addition, groups previously reliant on overseas funding either 
have to re-orientate themselves to the aims of the state or look for other sources of funding. A 
few had been successful in achieving the latter, whilst others had stopped applying for grants 
WR µUHWDLQ WKHLU LQGHSHQGHQFH¶ ,QWHUYLHZV   . The result, however, is that many 
TNGOs and GROs in this study now operate without funding. Consequently, the well-
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resourced NGOs (Marionettes) appear to be agents of social policy, rather than informing or 
challenging it, whilst those without funding (TNGOs and GROs), although independent of 
the state, will struggle to engage in any activity at all.  
 
Secondly, the provisions of the Law, specifically registration and financing, have reduced the 
number of active eNGOs in the sector. When the NGO Law was in its development phase, 
critics both within and outside the Russian Federation stated that the Russian NGO 
PRYHPHQWZRXOGEHFRQGHPQHGWRµHYLVFHUDWLRQ¶ (Dejevsky, 2005) if the bill became Law. 
Others pointed out the potential harm that could be done to domestic groups by restricting or 
controlling overseas donor assistance (Alekseeva et al., 2005) and that a draconian approach 
to implementation within a developing democracy could cut off fledgling shoots of civil 
society development before they had had time to develop (Abdullaev, 2006). The reported 
reduction in both active groups and group activity clearly reflects these criticisms. Groups not 
aligned with government objectives reported problems of continuing to operate in an 
environment where the Public Chamber determined funding opportunities, and where 
preference was given to Marionettes. TKLVKDGVXFNHGWKHµR[\JHQ¶,QWHUYLHZVRXW
of Russian civil society, making it difficult for these organisations to continue with their day-
to-day activity. Perhaps µHYLVFHUDWLRQ¶ 'HMHYVN\  LV D ELW VWURQJ EXW LI JURXSV DUH
IRUFHGµXQGHUJURXQG¶ (Interview 3.1) by the registration procedures, they lose their ability to 
influence policy or those making it.  
 
This leads to the third and final key observation that as funding, registration and other aspects 
of the Law deter smaller non-affiliated groups, Marionettes are likely to dominate 5XVVLD¶V
civil society landscape in the future. RDWKHUWKDQDµKROGLQJSDWWHUQ¶(Sundstrom and Henry, 
2006) Russian civil society appears to be moving away from that ruled by under-funded yet 
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independent groups that struggled to engage the public (Crotty, 2006), who were heavily 
reliant on overseas donor funding (Henderson, 2002), towards a sector dominated by groups 
funded and thus controlled by the state. Accordingly, it is likely that as creators of civil 
society (Osborne and Kaposvari, 1997), Marionettes will facilitate a Russian third sector that 
LV PRUH µPDQDJHG¶ ,QWHUYLHZ ; where NGOs are the agents of social policy, not the 
influencers of it. As such they are less likely to bridge the gap between the individual and the 
state, or hold it to account. The result can be summed up by one respondent in this study who 
said, 
Yes, we have democracy in Russia, but it is another one, different from other 
countries. (Interview 1.14) 
Of course, the co-option of NGOs by the state will and does happen in other countries, and is 
therefore not unique to Russia. However, the implications for this co-option given the 
weakness of both civil society and the NGO sector prior to the passing of the NGO Law 
means that Marionettes could become the only functioning, well-resourced NGOs within 
5XVVLD¶VWKLUGVHFWRU 
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Appendix 1- Overview of Interviewees 
 
No Main objectives Typology 
1.1 x Preservation of national parks x TNGO 
1.2 x Animal protection  x TNGO 
1.3 x Workshops and education for children on animals 
and nature 
x TNGO 
1.4 x Cultural Heritage; Assisting other groups with 
grant applications 
x TNGO 
1.5 x Share intellectual and practical knowledge about 
the environment. 
x Establish ecological legislation 
x Defend ecological rights of the population 
x Marionette 
1.6 x Professional assessment of environmental 
situation in Samara 
x Marionette 
1.7 x To bring state and enterprise together to solve 
environmental problems 
x Marionette 
1.8 x Public education  
x Engagement with roundtables 
x GRO 
1.9 x Stated aims are to improve ecological culture and 
politics 
x TNGO 
1.10 x Co-ordinate ecological activity across the region 
and overseas organisations 
x Contract work for state 
x Award grants on behalf of the Public Chamber 
x TNGO 
1.11 x &KLOGUHQ¶VDFWLYLWLHVLQWKHQDWLRQDOSDUN 
x Annual residential in the park for school children 
x Marionette 
1.12 x $WWUDFWIXQGLQJIRUFKLOGUHQ¶VHFRORJLFDODFWLYLWLHV
including education, festivals, action days 
x Marionette 
1.13 x Assist with the distribution of charitable funds 
from large companies to environmental and other 
projects 
x Marionette 
1.14 x Seeks donors for local projects including 
environmental 
x Acts as an agent for firms and the state fund 
public organisations 
x TNGO 
1.15 x Improve the quality of the environment and health 
LQ7RO¶\DWWL 
x Public education 
x TNGO 
1.16 x Annual rally to promote the uniqueness of the 
nature reserve 
x &KLOGUHQ¶VDFWLYLWLHVDQGHGXFDWLRQ 
x TNGO 
2.1 x Established by President Putin 
x Assessment of the environmental situation in 
x Marionette 
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Russia. Campaigning for specific improvements 
2.2 x Independent monitoring of radiation levels; 
ground and surface water 
x Marionette 
2.3 x &KLOGUHQ¶VSURMHFWVLQFOXGLQJHGXFDWLRQFOHDQLQJ
projects, festivals  
x Marionette 
3.1 x Campaign for environmental improvements 
through engagements with local authorities and 
politics. Participate in roundtables and field 
candidates for local and state dumas 
x +DGHOHFWHGORFDOGHSXWLHVGXULQJWKH(O¶WVLQ
period, no elected representatives currently 
x TNGO 
3.2 x Publish papers, debate and attempt to highlight 
environmental issues to the wider population and 
government 
x TNGO 
3.3 x Communicating environmental issues through 
own newspaper 
x Environmental monitoring and assessment 
x TNGO 
3.4 x 7RµLPSURYHWKHHQYLURQPHQWDOVLWXDWLRQLQ
9ROJRJUDG¶ 
x Marionette 
3.5 x Commentator through eco-press and other outlets x GRO 
3.6 x Focused on raising awareness and campaigning 
for an improved environment around the Red 
October steel works and district 
x Demonstrations and meetings 
x GRO 
3.7 x Communicating environmental issues to the state x TNGO 
 
                                                          
Notes 
 
1 An 2EODVW¶ is an administrative region equivalent to a State of County. It has its own elected legislature and its 
own budget. A Krai LVVLPLODUWRDQ2EODVW¶EXWVLJQLILFDQWO\ODUJHULQJHRJUDSKLFDOVL]HXVXDOO\ZLWKJUHDWHU
ethnic diversity. 
 
2 1*2VLQFOXGLQJIURP6DPDUD2EODVW¶IURP6WDYURSRO.UDLDQGIURP9ROJRJUDG2EODVW¶2IWKHVH
were GROs, 13 TNGOs and 10 were Marionette organisations.  
